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This paper presents new and official survey information 
on bank regulations in 142 countries and makes 
comparisons with two earlier surveys. The data do not 
suggest that countries have primarily reformed their bank 
regulations for the better over the last decade.  Following 
Basel guidelines many countries strengthened capital 
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regulations and official supervisory agencies, but existing 
evidence suggests that these reforms will not improve 
bank stability or efficiency. While some countries have 
empowered private monitoring of banks, consistent with 
the third pillar of Basel II, there are many exceptions and 
reversals along this dimension. 
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Is the bank regulatory environment in countries improving and making financial systems more 
efficient and stable? A decade after the East Asian crisis and the ever growing importance of 
developing-country-banking systems, the extent to which progress has been made in regulatory 
reform commands our attention for several  reasons.  Those concerned with the fragility of 
financial systems, whether from a social welfare or a narrower investor’s perspective, want to 
know if developing country’s financial systems are safer now than in the 1990s, or whether they 
merely appear safer as a result of the recent generous inflows of foreign capital. Furthermore, 
those formulating financial-sector policy recommendations, including the World Bank (Bank) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), want to know what to do next in improving the 
efficacy of financial systems, which presumably necessitates an understanding of what has been 
accomplished thus far.  Indeed, in 1999 the Bank and the IMF started the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) to assess systematically the status of financial systems in countries 
and to make recommendations for reform, including in the area of bank regulation.  As a result, 
Bank and Fund officials, among others, want to know the extent to which recommendations were 
adopted and whether the reforms were beneficial.  
Many seem to know what has happened to bank regulatory reforms in countries and to 
have drawn optimistic conclusions about recent changes – perhaps though with some rethinking 
taking place after the turbulence in credit markets that began in the summer of 2007.  After all, 
investors in recent years have been putting their money into emerging market economies at very 
narrow interest rate spreads.  Also, Martin Wolf commented that ‘…there have been substantial 
structural improvements in Asian economies, notably in the capitalization and regulation of 
financial systems’ (Financial Times, May 23, 2007).  Still others believe that bank regulation and 
supervision are now sufficiently effective to warrant more aggressive capital account 
liberalization.  For example, Ken Rogoff (2007) recently suggested that while IMF 
recommendations in the 1990s to liberalize more fully capital account transactions might have 
been premature, now is the time for the IMF, still searching for a new direction for itself, to 
resume this effort.  
Yet, do we actually know what has happened to banking policies in recent years and is 
there any evidence regarding the consequences of the actions that have been taken?  Have 
changes in the bank regulatory environment enhanced the creditworthiness of developing   
 
 
                                                
countries?  Is bank regulation so much better now that one should not expect crises to follow 
from greater capital account liberalization?  In addition to these important questions about the 
stability of financial systems, policy makers are also concerned about other features of their 
financial systems.  Will the bank regulatory framework prescribed by the Basel Committee on 
Bank Supervision increase access to financial services?  Have changes in regulation contributed 
to financial-sector development and the allocation of capital by banks to those firms most likely 
to promote growth and reduce poverty?  And what about the efficiency of banks, or their 
corporate governance, and corruption in the lending process itself?   These questions regarding 
the recent changes in the regulatory environment and their effects represent a natural area of 
inquiry. 
More than ten years ago, a similar set of questions motivated us to start assembling the 
first cross-country database on bank regulation and supervision.  Based on guidance from bank 
supervisors, financial economists, and our own experiences, we began putting together an 
extensive survey of bank regulation and supervision.
1  The original survey, Survey I, had 117 
country respondents between 1998 and 2000.  The first update in 2003, Survey II, characterized 
the regulatory situation at the end of 2002, and had 152 respondents.  Survey III was posted at 
the Bank website in the summer of 2007 with responses from 142 countries. Survey III is special 
because barring a postponement in Europe on par with that in the United States; it represents the 
last look at the world before many countries formally begin implementing Basel II, the revised 
Capital Accord. 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section II will very briefly review the structure of the 
survey and discuss some issues that arise in the responses to the three surveys.   Next, Section III 
looks at the state of bank regulation around the world in 2006, and importantly how it has 
changed in the last 10 years.  Section IV then turns to a first analysis of the data, asking whether 
the changes in bank regulation are contributing positively to financial sector development (and 
thus we hope to the wider availability of financial services) and to the stability of banking 
systems around the world.  Section V concludes with lessons for Basel II, and for countries that 
are grappling with a response to it.   
 
1 As in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006), hereinafter BCL, we sometimes use the term regulation generically to 
apply to banking-sector policies and compliance mechanisms, while at other times to discuss particular, specific 
regulations or special aspects of supervision.   
  2  
 
 
                                                
Based on our empirical analysis of what works best in bank regulation (BCL, 2006) and 
the subsequent changes that have taken place since the late 1990s in the regulatory environment, 
we see no basis for the view that countries around the world have primarily reformed for the 
better.  While many have followed the Basel guidelines and strengthened capital regulations and 
empowered supervisory agencies to a greater degree, existing evidence does not suggest that this 
will improve banking-system stability, enhance the efficiency of intermediation, or reduce 
corruption in lending.  While some countries have reformed their regulations to empower private 
monitoring, consistent with the third pillar of Basel II, there are many exceptions and even 
reversals along this dimension.  Moreover, many countries intensified restrictions on non-lending 
activities, which existing evidence suggests hurts banking system stability, lowers bank 
development, and reduces the efficiency of financial intermediation.   
Our tempered advice continues to be that countries will benefit from an approach to bank 
regulation that is grounded in what has worked in practice.  In our earlier work, we found that an 
approach that favors private monitoring, limits moral hazard, removes activity restrictions on 
banks, encourages competition, including competition by foreign banks, and requires or 
encourages greater diversification appears to work best to foster more stable, more efficient, and 
less corrupt financial-sector development.  Our earlier findings did not support a hurried 
adoption of the first two pillars of Basel II by developing countries, but rather stressed the value 
of first developing the legal, information, and incentive systems in which financial systems 
flourish to the benefit of everyone. Based on the existing evidence, we continue to believe that 
this approach is the most sensible one for country authorities to pursue.  Critically, the data in 
this new survey provide the raw material for research that should help confirm, refute, or refine 
this private-monitoring view.   
 
II.  The 2006 Survey 
The Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision Around the World assembles and makes 
available a database to permit international comparisons of various features of the bank 
regulatory environment.  Current and previous surveys and responses are on the World Bank 
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  Most questions could be answered “Yes/No” though in many cases we requested that in case of 
doubt the authorities attach governing regulations or laws.  Some of the questions in the latest 
version explicitly or implicitly refer to Basel II, such as those enquiring as to the plans for the 
implementation of Basel II, and if so then the variant of the first pillar to be adopted.  Similarly, 
some of the questions relating to capital, provisioning, and supervision have been modified to 
keep abreast of current thinking and emerging practice in these areas.    
Before turning to the data, an obvious question concerns the accuracy of the responses.  The 
survey was sent to the principal contacts in each country of the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision.  Even though these contacts should know the regulatory environment, the survey’s 
scope is such that for any country a number of people usually are involved in its completion, and 
some or all of the members of this group might change over time, raising the issue of differences 
in the interpretation of questions over time (in addition to changes in the wording noted above).  
In order to attain the greatest possible consistency over time, we adopted several approaches: 
going back to authorities for clarification, where there were notable changes, as well as posting 
the survey responses on the web, so that the data could be challenged and inconsistencies 
resolved.   
We also searched for instances in which there was a reversal in a country’s response to a 
question across the different surveys, e.g., if a component of an index rose from Surveys I to II 
and then declined from Survey II to Survey III, or vice versa. Such a change could, though need 
not, be due to an error in reporting, or possibly a difference in interpretation due to a change in 
the person or persons replying on behalf of the regulatory agency.  With the exception of some of 
the components of the index on the overall restrictiveness of bank activities, where mostly small 
reversals occurred in about 20% of the cases, few reversals were seen in the other components.  
The full results of this analysis are reported in the working paper version of this paper.  Again, 
these reversals are not necessarily an indication of errors, particularly for those questions that 
require a simple yes or no answer.   However, these cases might merit further checking.   
Another way to insure accuracy is through the publication of the results.  Surveys I and II 
have been posted since 2000 and 2004, respectively, so one would assume that authorities, 
especially after prompting from the Bank, would have reported errors by now.  Yet each survey 
had only a handful of countries questioning an individual response, notwithstanding that each 
survey has been posted for a number of years. Survey III was just posted in July 2007.   
  4  
 
  To summarize, despite investing significant effort in cleaning the data, we did not 
always receive clear responses from the authorities and are concerned that they suffer from 
survey fatigue.   We therefore recommend ongoing efforts to clean (and update) the data. It 
might also be noted that some countries chose not to respond to any surveys, not to respond to 
some surveys but to others, and  not to answer some questions but others, which raises the 
question as to whether this was a strategic decision or simply survey fatigue. 
We will not go into detail about the specific contents of the survey here given the earlier 
explanations provided in BCL (2006, 2004, and 2001).  The latest survey continues to group the 
survey questions and responses into the same twelve sections as previously, namely,  
•  Entry into banking 
•  Ownership 
•  Capital 
•  Activities 
•  External auditing requirements 
•  Internal management/organizational requirements 
•  Liquidity and diversification requirements 
•  Depositor (savings) protection schemes 
•  Provisioning requirements 
•  Accounting/information disclosure requirements 
•  Discipline/problem institutions/exit, and 
•  Supervision. 
 
Also, as is evident in the survey, the majority of questions are structured to be in a yes/no format, 
or otherwise require a precise, often quantitative, response.  Experience suggests that simple and 
precise questions increase the response rate and reduce the potential for mis-interpretation. 
With the third survey, we now have data spanning almost a decade, as the first responses 
to the initial survey were recorded in 1998.  Since Survey I was the initial launch of the survey, 
and as internet penetration in a number of developing countries was still on the increase, many of 
the responses came in gradually during 1998-99, but a number of them were received in 2000 as 
well.  The second survey (Survey II) was conducted in early 2003, assessing the state of 
regulation as of the end of 2002.  Survey III, the latest update, sought a characterization of the 
environment as of the end of 2005.  However, it took considerable time to clean the data, which 
involved going back to country authorities for clarifications, and process it for presentation on 
the World Bank website.  Thus the data from Survey III was only available in early July of 2007 
and it is perhaps accurate to interpret the responses as describing the situation in 2006.   
  5  
 
 
                                                
The survey consists of a large number of questions.  Survey I was composed of about 
180 questions.  We substantially expanded Survey II to 275 questions.  Changes to the current 
survey were more limited, with most changes aimed at achieving greater clarity and precision, 
and others made in anticipation of Basel II, so that Survey III has a bit over 300 questions. 
Although the responses to individual questions are of interest in their own right, 
especially for authorities who want to compare particular features of their own banking systems 
with those in other countries, it is difficult to extract broad lessons from so many responses.  Yet 
policy makers want to know the general direction in which to proceed with reforms (e.g., 
whether to emphasize bank activity restrictions, capital requirements, bank supervision, or 
private monitoring) to improve banking systems.  Consequently, this group will appreciate a 
greater degree of grouping and aggregation (and thus quantification) of the responses, as will 
empirical researchers bound by degrees of freedom (and a need for quantifiable variables).  So 
we follow our earlier practice (BCL 2006, 2004, and 2001) and aggregate the data into broader 
indices, the principal ones being: Overall Restrictions (on bank activities), Entry Requirements, 
Official Supervisory Powers, Private Monitoring, and Capital Regulation.  As in the past, we 
stress that there is no unique grouping or aggregation (or even quantification), and we encourage 
researchers to experiment with their own groupings.
3 
 
III.  Bank Regulation and Supervision Around the World: What the Data Say 
With three surveys over almost a decade, one can ask to what extent have there been changes in 
the regulatory environment in countries around the world.  As Survey III is just becoming 
available, analysis of these changes understandably is in an early stage, and we hope that with 
the data available on the web, more people will investigate the impact of variations in bank 
regulation on various outcomes.  Also, in principle this analysis can be done for all of the 
individual questions and countries that are available over the surveys.  Here we restrict our 
attention to the major indices described in the previous section and developed in BCL (2006).   
Figure 1 shows the changes in overall restrictiveness of bank activities from Surveys I to 
III.  Since a change in a positive direction indicates a move toward greater restrictiveness, it 
 
3 See BCL (2006) for the description of the indices, and the caveat on their arbitrary nature. For example, we include 
the Certified Audit Required variable, which measures whether an external audit by a licensed or certified auditor is 
required of banks, in the index of Private Monitoring.  Yet, in the countries in which this is a requirement imposed 
by supervisors, one could instead include this variable in an index of supervision.   
  6  
 
  appears as though restrictions on what banks can do are on the increase.  We highlight in black 
three large, high-income countries, namely Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, as 
well as seven countries whose banking crises for different reasons were the focus of attention in 
the 1990s: Argentina, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Russia.  The 
contrast between two crisis countries is of interest.  In particular, Mexico responded to the 1994 
crisis by easing restrictions on banks, while Argentina saw tightened restrictions and policies that 
led foreign banks to withdraw.  Most other crisis countries also moved in the direction of greater 
restrictions.  The U.S. moved in the opposite direction reflects the dismantling of the Glass-
Steagall barriers separating commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance. 
Domestic bank entry requirements mostly remained unchanged, though there was some 
tightening in crisis countries, as well as in the U.S. case.  Note that this index essentially counts 
the number of requirements for a banking license: (1) Draft by-laws; (2) Intended organizational 
chart; (3) Financial projections for first three years; (4) Financial information on main potential 
shareholders; (5) Background/experience of future directors; (6) Background/experience of 
future managers; (7) Sources of funds to be used to capitalize the new bank; and (8) Market 
differentiation intended for the new bank.  Thus this index is a proxy for the hurdles that entrants 
have to overcome to get a license. However, the absence of changes does not necessarily imply 
that the banking sector was not undergoing significant change, as foreign entry was expanding 
sharply in a number of countries.   
We also collected information on the percentage of assets in majority-owned foreign 
banks, and here the changes have been dramatic.  In the aftermath of their crises, foreign 
presence rose significantly in Mexico, Korea, and Indonesia, barely changed in Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Russia, and fell significantly in Argentina.  Some countries rely on foreign 
entities either to take over insolvent banks and/or to expand their intermediation activities while 
insolvent banks are restructured, downsized or closed, similar to the way Texas first permitted 
banks from outside its state to take over its banking system during the crisis in the 1980s.  
Others, like Argentina, foisted such a large share of the costs of the crisis on already present 
foreign banks that some left and some potential entrants surely stayed away.  
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the changes in the indices measuring the three pillars of Basel II, 
namely Capital Regulation, Official Supervisory Power, and Private Monitoring, respectively.  
Interestingly, those countries easing capital requirements are only slightly less numerous than 
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those moving in the opposite direction.  Once again, Argentina stands out, with the weakening 
in its capital requirements having been part of the effort to ease regulation in advance of the 
crisis, with Korea and Japan making similar moves but in the aftermath of their crises.  Argentina 
did not change its official supervisory power, though it should be noted that any weakening in 
the exercise of these powers is not measured here.  There is a more noticeable balance of 
countries moving to strengthen official supervision, or at least provide supervisors with more 
explicit power, notably in Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, and to some degree in Russia. 
Unfortunately, as we will return to below, an increase in supervisory power was not found to be 
helpful in bank development, performance, and stability in our earlier work (BCL 2006), 
particularly in countries with a weak institutional environment, and actually was associated with 
increased corruption in the lending process.
4  Interestingly, the U.K. authorities moved in the 
opposite direction, and have established a working group, whose report is due shortly, to address 
concerns about excessive regulation and supervision. 
Private Monitoring, a proxy for the third pillar of Basel II, has been found to be positively 
linked with a number of desirable outcomes in the banking sector, and appears generally to be on 
the rise in a number of countries, with Mexico once again in the lead.  Only a few countries, 
notably including the United Kingdom and Malaysia have seen a decline in their score on this 
index.   
As with all of these changes, we examined the changes in the individual components of 
the indices to identify which factors account for the variations in the indices.  Thus in the U.K. 
case, private monitoring weakened slightly because of the change to an affirmative in the 
response to the question, “Does accrued, though unpaid interest/ principal enter the income 
statement while the loan is still non-performing?  Here the rationale is that allowing accrued but 
unpaid interest for a non-performing loan makes it more difficult for market participants to 
perceive the underlying health of a bank. Readers are welcome to investigate the sources of other 
changes with these tables, using the data on the World Bank’s website, noted above.  
We will now turn our attention to a more systematic extension of our earlier research to 
gauge the impact of the aforementioned changes in the regulatory environment on the 
development of the banking sector, its fragility, and other outcomes of interest.  
 
4  This is based on a survey of bank borrowers on the extent to which they had to pay a bribe to get a bank loan.  
Since in this effort we controlled for economy-wide corruption, it is not the case that our results reflect countries 
stepping up supervision in response to greater corruption.  
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IV.  Bank Regulation and Supervision Around the World: What the Data Mean 
IV.A. How reforms affect banking systems: Overview 
How have reforms to bank regulations and supervisory practices affected national banking 
systems?  In countries that changed their regulatory policies, have these reforms reduced banking 
system fragility and boosted banking system development?  Have these policy changes enhanced 
the efficiency of intermediation and moderated corruption in the lending process?  Answers to 
these questions will help some countries adjust their reforms and help other countries avoid 
mistakes and select more appropriate reform strategies. 
Given the available data, we conduct some illustrative simulations to assess the 
potentially impact of bank-regulatory reforms over the last decade on national banking systems.  
In the first step, we estimate the relationships between bank regulations and banking-system 
fragility, development, efficiency, and corruption in lending.  These estimates are based on 
Survey I and analyses in BCL (2006).  In the second step, we use the estimate coefficient from 
the first step to compute the impact of regulatory reforms between Survey I and Survey III on 
banking-system fragility, development, efficiency, and corruption.  We make these computations 
for each country and describe this simulation strategy in greater detail below.
5 
 
IV.B Baseline regressions 
Table 1 presents estimates of the relationships between various bank regulations and banking-
system fragility, development, efficiency, and corruption.  Since BCL (2006) explain these 
estimation processes in great detail, we provide a very brief synopsis of that description.
6  
                                                 
5 One difference between the estimates reported in this paper and our earlier work is that here we now use indexes 
based on the summation of the individual questions, rather than computing the principal component of the individual 
questions underlying the indexes.  We do this because it makes it much more transparent to see how changes in an 
individual question changed the index, and hence the estimated probability of a systemic banking crisis.  Also, 
ideally, we would examine how changes in regulatory reforms affect banking-system fragility, development, 
efficiency, and corruption.  This would involve first computing changes in bank regulations for each country, which 
we documented above in Section III.  Second, we would need to compute changes in banking system fragility, 
development, efficiency, and corruption from 1999 (Survey I) through 2007 (Survey III).  Unfortunately, these data 
are not yet available. Thus, an examination of how changes in banking regulation affect changes in banking-system 
characteristics will have to wait until these data are constructed. 
6 Due to poor response quality in Survey III on question 8.3.1, we made a small adjustment to the Private 
Monitoring Index for conducting the baseline regressions based on Survey I.  We do not include 8.3.1 in the private 
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First, consider banking-system fragility, which we measure as a dummy variable that 
equals one if the country experienced a systemic crisis during the period 1988-1999, and zero if 
it did not. While inherently arbitrary, we join Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2008), 
among others, and classify a systemic crisis as one where (1) emergency measures were taken to 
assist the banking system (such as bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to 
depositors or other bank creditors), or (2) large-scale nationalizations took place, or (3) non-
performing assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of the crisis, or (4) the 
cost of the rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP.  We conduct a logit estimation based 
on key regulatory variables. Since many studies find that macroeconomic instability induces 
banking-sector distress, we also include the average inflation rate during the five years prior to 
the crisis in countries that experienced a banking crisis.  In countries that did not, we include the 
average inflation rate during the five years prior to the survey of bank regulatory and supervisory 
indicators (1993-1997). 
One key finding on fragility from equation 1 is that regulatory restrictions on banking 
activities (Activity Restrictions) increase the probability of a banking crisis.   Many argue that 
restricting banks from engaging in nonlending services, such as securities market activities, 
underwriting insurance, owning nonfinancial firms, or participating in real estate transactions, 
will reduce bank risk taking and therefore increase banking-system stability.  We find no support 
for this claim.  Rather, we find that restricting bank activities increases bank fragility.  Fewer 
regulatory restrictions may increase the franchise value of banks and thereby augment incentives 
for more prudent behavior. Or, banks that engage in a broad array of activities may find it easier 
to diversify income streams and thereby become more resilient to shocks, with positive 
implications for banking-system stability. 
The second key finding on fragility involves the diversification index, which includes 
information on whether there are regulatory guidelines concerning loan diversification and the 
absence of restrictions on making loans abroad. Diversification is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of a crisis but diversification guidelines have less of a stabilizing effect in bigger 
economies, as measured by the logarithm of GNP. The inflection point is quite high; 
diversification guidelines have significant stabilizing effects in all but the nine largest countries.   
 
monitoring index for the Table 1 regressions below based on the Survey I indexes.  This has little effect on the 
estimated results.  
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  Second, consider bank corruption, which is measured by asking firms whether 
corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firm growth.  These data are obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey, and the details are described in greater 
detail in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006).  In particular, a value of one signifies that 
corruption is an obstacle, while a value of zero means that firms responded that corruption of 
bank officials is not an obstacle.  The survey covers 2,259 firms across 37 countries in our 
sample.  The firm-level regression in equation (2) of Table 1 controls for many firm level 
characteristics besides the national bank regulation indexes.  These data allows us to test 
conflicting theoretical predictions regarding the impact of specific bank supervisory strategies on 
the extent to which corruption of bank officials impedes the efficient allocation of bank credit.  
The public interest view holds that a powerful supervisory agency that directly monitors and 
disciplines banks can enhance the corporate governance of banks, reduce corruption in bank 
lending, and thereby boost the efficiency with which banks intermediate society’s savings.  In 
contrast, the private interest view argues that politicians and supervisors may induce banks to 
divert the flow of credit to politically connected firms, or banks may “capture” supervisors and 
induce them to act in the best interests of banks rather than in the best interests of society.  This 
theory suggests that strengthening official supervisory power – in the absence of political and 
legal institutions that induce politicians and regulator to act in the best interests of society – may 
actually reduce the integrity of bank lending with adverse implications on the efficiency of credit 
allocation.  
As shown in Table 1 equation (2), there are two key findings concerning corruption and 
bank regulation.  First, the results contradict the public interest view, which predicts that 
powerful supervisory agencies will reduce market failures, with positive implications for the 
integrity of bank-firm relations.  Rather, we observe that Official Supervisory Power never enters 
the Bank Corruption regressions with a positive and significant coefficient.   
Second, the results are broadly consistent with the private interest view.  The positive 
coefficient on Official Supervisory Power is consistent with concerns that governments with 
powerful supervisors further their own interests by inducing banks to lend to politically-
connected firms, so that strengthening official supervision accommodates increased corruption in 
bank lending.   Beck et al. (2006) show that sound political and legal systems reduce the 
pernicious effects of official supervisory power, but they never find that empowering official 
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supervisors significantly reduces corruption in lending. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that Private 
Monitoring enters negatively and significantly, which further supports the private interest view 
of bank regulation.  Firms in countries with stronger private monitoring tend to have less of a 
need for corrupt ties to obtain bank loans.  This is consistent with the assertion that laws that 
enhance private monitoring will improve corporate governance of banks with positive 
implications for the integrity of bank-firm relations.   
Next, we consider bank development, which is measured as the ratio of bank credit to 
private firms as a share of GDP in 2001.  Although bank development is an imperfect indicator 
of banking-system performance, past research shows that this specific bank-development 
variable is a good predictor of long-run economic growth (Levine, 2006).  In equation (3), we 
also control for the legal origin of each country since Beck et al. (2003) show that legal origin 
helps explain cross-country differences in bank development.
7 
In terms of bank development, there are two major results reported in Table 1.  First and 
foremost, policies that strengthen the rights of private-sector monitors of banks are associated 
with higher levels of bank development.  Our results on strengthening private-sector monitoring 
of banks emphasize the importance of regulations that make it easier for private investors to 
acquire reliable information about banks and exert discipline over banks.  This finding 
underscores Basel II’s third pillar.  Second, regulatory restrictions on bank activities retard Bank 
Development. The results do not support the view that financial conglomerates impede 
governance and hurt the operation of the financial system.  These findings are more consistent 
with the existence of economies of scope in the provision of financial services; though see 
Laeven and Levine (2007), who find no evidence of economies of scope in banks that diversify 
their activities beyond lending. 
Finally, consider banking-system efficiency, which we measure as (i) the net interest 
income margin relative to total assets and (ii) overhead costs relative to total assets for a large 
cross-section of banks in each country.  High net interest margins can signal inefficient 
intermediation and greater market power that allows banks to charge high margins.  High 
overhead costs can signal unwarranted managerial perquisites and market power that contradict 
the notions of sound governance of banks and efficient intermediation. To identify the 
 
7 The OLS estimate is used in the simulations below although the instrumental variable results produce similar 
findings 
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  independent relationship between these bank efficiency measures and bank regulations, we 
control for an array of bank-specific traits, including the bank’s market share, its size, the 
liquidity of its assets, bank equity,  and the proportion of income that the bank receives in non-
interest bearing assets.   
The results shown in Table 1, equations (4) and (5), again advertise the benefits of 
regulations that empower private-sector monitoring of banks.  These regressions use a cross-
section of 1,362 banks across 68 countries.   The bank-level data are averaged over the period 
1995-1999.  We average over a few years to reduce the potential impact of business-cycle 
fluctuations on these measures of bank efficiency, but obtain similar results hold when using data 
from 1999 only.  Private Monitoring is associated with greater bank efficiency, as measured by 
lower levels of Net Interest Margin and Overhead Costs.  These findings, and those in Demirguc-
Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004), suggest bank regulatory and supervisory policies that foster 
private-sector monitoring enhance bank efficiency. 
 
IV. C. Simulation mechanics 
The simulation mechanics for the bank development and efficiency regressions are 
straightforward.  These are simple linear regressions from the estimated relationships in Table 1: 
Y = α + βX, 
where Y is either bank development, the net interest margin, or overhead costs, X is the matrix of 
explanatory variables from Survey I listed in Table 1 for each regression, α and β are the 
estimated parameters shown in Table 1.   
Differencing the above equation yields 
∆Y = β∆X, 
where ∆X is the change in the explanatory variables between Survey I and Survey III.  
Specifically, it is the value in Survey III minus the value in Survey I.  This equation then 
provides the forecasted or simulated change in Y (bank development, the net interest margin, or 
overhead costs) resulting from reforms to the regulatory system between Survey I and Survey III, 
based on the estimated relationships from Survey I reported in Table 1.  We assume that the non-
regulatory variables remain fixed and therefore only focus on estimating the effects of the change 
in regulatory policies on the banking system.  We performed the simulations of regulatory 
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  reforms for each country in the survey that was (i) included in the Table 1 regressions and (ii) 
has complete data for Survey III. 
The simulation mechanics are bit more involved for the logit regressions because this is a 
nonlinear estimator.  In our case, P equals the probability that the country suffers a systemic 
crisis (or the probability that a firm responds that corrupt bank officials are an impediment to its 
growth).  Then, in Table 1, we estimate the following equation: 
Logit (P) = α + βX. 
In order to compute the estimated change in the probability of a crisis resulting from a 
change in a particular index xk within the full matrix of explanatory variables X, we cannot 
simply use the estimated βk for that particular index.  The coefficients from the logit model have 
to be rescaled in order to illustrate the marginal effect on the probability of a crisis.  This 
rescaling must account for the initial conditions for each country.  In order to compute country- 
specific marginal effects on a particular regulatory variable xk, therefore, we apply the standard 
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The ratio on the right-hand-side of the equation is a country-specific scale effect. For this 
scale effect, we use the initial reported valued from Survey I.  Thus, we are assessing the 
estimated impact on the probability of a crisis from changes in regulatory policies from Survey I 
to Survey III based on the initial conditions defined by Survey I. The country-specific marginal 
effects for the change in a particular index, xk, are then obtained by multiplying this scale factor 
with the estimated logit coefficient, βk.  In this manner, we present the estimated change in the 
probability of a crisis in each country from the change in each regulatory index from Survey I to 
Survey III. 
There are many serious caveats associated with these simulations.  First, we are assuming 
that the equation defining the relationship between the dependent variables and the regressors 
has not changed across the different sampling period.  Second, we are assuming that the only 
change in each simulation reported below is that one of the regulatory variables changes, and that 
the observed changes in the regulatory variables are measured without error.  Third, we are 
assuming that the estimated relations between regulations and various banking-sector outcomes 
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  have not changed over the last decade, i.e., the estimated coefficients, theβ’s, have not changed. 
Fourth, in the non-linear regressions involving crises and corruption in lending, we are also 
assuming that changes in the non-bank regulatory variables do not materially affect the 
computed marginal impact of regulatory changes on the outcome measures.  Fifth, these 
simulations do not assess dynamics.  Changes in bank regulations will affect bank development, 
corruption in lending, bank efficiency, and banking-system stability over time, not 
instantaneously.  We do not account for this. Given these assumptions, the estimated standard 




1/2, where ∆Xi is the 
change in the regulatory indicator in country i, σ(β) is the estimate standard error on the 
parameter β, and σ(ε) is the standard error of the residual from the initial equation.  This 
accounts for the uncertainty of parameter estimate and the estimated model.
8 In the simulations 
that follow, only the ten countries with the biggest changes regulatory changes in each 
simulation have an estimated change in the dependent variable that is more than a standard 
deviation away from the null hypothesis of no change. 
In sum, these simulations are at best an illustrative first evaluation of the data.  They do 
not provide tight inferences about the impact of regulatory changes on the banking system.   
Future research will need to directly analyze the impact of these regulatory changes using panel 
procedures that relax the assumptions discussed above.   
 
IV.D. How reforms affect banking systems: Illustrative simulations 
Given changes in bank regulations around the world over the last decade, this subsection 
provides estimates of the impact of these changes on national banking systems.  For each 
country, we illustrate the impact of changes in relevant regulatory indexes on (1) banking-system 
fragility, (2) corruption in lending, (3) bank development, and (4) banking-system efficiency.  By 
“relevant regulatory indexes,” we refer to regulatory indexes that enter statistically significantly 
in Table 1.  We present the simulation results for each of these indexes for every county in the 
sample.  We emphasize that these simulations are subject to the many qualifications regarding 
the underlying estimates presented in Table 1 that are discussed in detail in our book (BCL, 
2006).  It is difficult to overstress these qualifications.  Yet, given all of these qualifications, we 
                                                 
8 The estimated standard error of the simulated forecast is a bit more complex when using the logit estimator 
because it is nonlinearity. 
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  use the systematic, consistent estimates provided in Table 1 to illustrate the potential impact of 
recent regulatory changes on national banking systems.  Also, to continue our narrative on ten 
particular countries, we focus the discussion on Argentina, France, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, even though other 
countries have frequently undertaken the biggest regulatory reforms, which will be illustrated in 
the figures. Finally, for each regulatory index and for each country, we show which individual 
regulations changed by documenting changes question-by-question.  Thus, readers can readily 
identify which individual regulatory reforms produce the changes in the indices that we use when 
conducting the simulations. 
 
IV.D.1 banking crises 
Figure 5 presents the estimated changes in the probability of a crisis for each country resulting 
from the change in regulatory restrictions on bank activities from Survey I (1997) to Survey III 
(2007).  In presenting the simulations, we use terms such as “increased fragility” or “enhanced 
stability” to describe increases or decreases, respectively, in the estimated probability of a 
systemic banking-system crisis in a particular country.  Crucially, we examine the impact of a 
country’s changing bank regulations on the probability of a systemic crisis in that country.  We 
do not examine contagion.  Nor do we aggregate regulatory changes across individual countries 
and weight the resultant fragility effects by the financial importance of each country to derive an 
estimate of a world financial system crisis.  These are valuable extensions.     
By intensifying regulatory restrictions on bank activities, many countries increased 
banking-system fragility according to our simulations.  The simulations suggest that Argentina 
and Russia imposed additional restrictions on bank activities and these reforms will increase the 
probability of a systemic crisis by between 20 and 40 percent.  Other countries relaxed 
restrictions on bank activities, allowing banks to diversify income flows with positive effects on 
banking-system stability.  According to our estimates, Mexico’s reduction in regulatory 
impediments to banks engaging in non-lending services will have a large stabilizing effect on 
Mexico’s banking system.  On a much smaller level, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. also reduced 
activity restrictions, with corresponding boosts to stability.  
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IV.D.2 corruption in lending   
Figures 6 and 7 present the simulation results of changes in official supervisory power and 
private monitoring on corruption in lending based on equation (2) in Table 1.  As discussed 
above, regulations that empower official supervisors are associated with greater corruption in 
lending, except in countries with exceptionally high levels of democratic political institutions, 
while private monitoring reduces corruption in lending by inducing a more transparent banking 
environment.  The simulations provide some stark warnings and encouragement regarding 
reforms during the last decade. 
The simulations suggest that some countries increased the likelihood of corruption of 
bank officials by increasing official supervisory power and by reducing private monitoring.  In 
particular, Malaysia increased the probability that corrupt bank officials will act as a barrier to 
firm growth by boosting the power and discretion of official supervisors.  Moreover, Malaysia 
also enacted regulations that reduced private monitoring, which -- according to our simulations -- 
will further intensify corruption in lending in these two economies.  Taken together, the 
simulations suggest that the probability that a firm will view the corruption of bank officials as 
an impediment to firm growth will rise by almost ten percent in Malaysia. 
In turn, other countries reduced the likelihood of corruption in lending by adjusting bank 
regulations to facilitate private monitoring of banks, including Mexico.  Mexico is an interesting 
case.  It enacted regulations that both enhanced private monitoring and boosted official 
supervisory power.  According to our estimates, these should exert countervailing effects on 
corruption in lending within Mexico.  Taken together, the simulations suggest that the 
probability that a firm will view the corruption of bank officials as an impediment to firm growth 
will fall by about two percent in Mexico.  Furthermore, based on information not included in the 
survey, the strengthening of democratic institutions over the last decade provides some support 
for the view that the harmful effects of strengthening official supervisory power will be mitigated 
so that the beneficial effects of stronger private monitoring will be even more dominate in 
Mexico. 
 
IV.D.3 bank development 
Two regulatory indexes dominate the relationship with overall banking-system development: 
Activity Restrictions and Private Monitoring.  Mexico both reformed to boost private monitoring 
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  and reformed to reduce activity restrictions.  Based on our simulations, these reforms should 
reinforce each other and boost banking-system development substantially in Mexico.  The 
combined effects are potentially huge.  While subject to ample qualifications, the simulations 
suggest that banking development in Mexico could rise by as much as 50 percent of GDP due to 
these two regulatory changes, from an admittedly low level.  Malaysia lies at the other extreme 
because it made regulatory changes that tend to weaken private monitoring, while also imposing 
greater restrictions on the activities of banks.  According to our estimates, these bank regulatory 
reforms will lower banking-system development in Malaysia by about 15 percent of GDP.  There 
are also more mixed, nuanced country cases.  The strengthening of private monitoring in 
Indonesia, Russia, and Argentina will tend to boost bank development.  However, these countries 
also increased regulatory restrictions on banks, which our estimates suggest will counteract the 
beneficial effects of boosting private monitoring.  On net, we forecast little change in bank 
development in these economies. 
 
IV.D.4 bank efficiency 
Finally, we also conducted simulations based on two indictors of bank efficiency.  The first 
measures the net interest margin as a fraction of total interest earning assets and the second 
measures overhead costs as share of total assets.  Since the private monitoring index is the only 
regulatory indicator that significantly enters both the regression where net interest margin and 
the regression where overhead costs are the dependent variables, we only report the results on 
this regulatory index.   
Mexico Indonesia, Japan, and Argentina reformed their policies in ways that are likely to 
enhance banking-system efficiency.  In contrast, Malaysia and the United Kingdom changed 
regulations in a manner that is likely to reduce private monitoring, with adverse effects on bank 
efficiency.  For example, the simulations suggest that interest margins are likely to fall by over 
one percentage point in Mexico. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
Over the last ten years, many countries have substantially reformed components of their bank-
regulatory regimes.  Based on our analyses of the pros and cons of a wide range of bank 
regulations (BCL, 2006), there is no reason for believing that countries around the world have 
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  primarily reformed for the better.  While many have followed the Basel guidelines and 
strengthened capital regulations and empowered supervisory agencies, existing evidence does 
not suggest that this will improve banking-system stability, enhance the efficiency of 
intermediation, or reduce corruption in lending.  While some countries have reformed their 
regulations to empower private monitoring, consistent with the third pillar of Basel II, there are 
many exceptions and reversals along this dimension.  Furthermore, many countries intensified 
restrictions on the non-lending activities, which existing evidence suggests hurts banking-system 
stability, lowers bank development, and reduces the efficiency of financial intermediation.  
Indeed, our simulations advertise the case in two countries.  Malaysia empowered official 
supervision, reduced private monitoring regulations, and imposed greater restrictions on the non-
lending activities of banks after its crisis.  Mexico, while also strengthening official supervisory 
power, substantively increased regulations that enhance private monitoring and reduced 
restrictions on bank activities.  While many other factors change in a country and many 
institutional characteristics shape the efficacy of bank regulations, our initial and preliminary 
estimates suggest greater optimism about Mexico’s reforms than Malaysia’s.  In sum, our 
examination of the latest data on bank regulation around the world does not provide a uniformly 
positive view of recent reforms. 
While our preliminary examination of the data challenges the confident proclamations of 
many observers about improvements in bank regulation and supervision, the qualifications 
associated with these results must be prominently and repeatedly explicated.  We do not relate 
changes in bank regulations to changes in outcomes.  Thus, we do not run any regressions of 
changes in bank fragility, development, efficiency, or corruption on changes in bank regulations.  
We leave that to future research.  Rather, in this paper, we first document the responses in 
Survey III and illustrate changes in bank regulations that have taken place over the last decade.  
Then, based on our early estimates from Survey I, we simulate how changes in bank regulations 
may influence various outcomes.  In sum, the conclusion of this paper is where the analytics 
begin.  Given these new data on banking-system reforms, researchers must assess the direct 
impact of these reforms on national banking systems to be more confident about which 
regulatory changes are for the better and which for the worse.  
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Activity Restriction  0.413 
(0.015)** 
Government Firm  -0.116
(0.572) 
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(0.000)*** 
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   Services  Sector  0.129    Growth  -0.24   -0.14 
       (0.368)       (0.009)*** (0.051)* 
Constant  -4.072 Constant  -0.623 Constant  0.565 Constant  7.319   6.726 
   (0.215)     (0.101)    (0.070)*    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations  52 Observations  2259 Observations  69 Observations  1362   1365 
       Countries  33  R-squared  0.547  Number of countries  68   68 
            
Robust p values in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
Figure 1: Change in the Index of Overall Restrictions on Bank Activities from 
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Notes: The index of overall restrictions on bank activities measures the degree to which 
banks face regulatory restrictions on their activities in (a) securities markets, (b) 
insurance, (c) real-estate, and (d) owning shares in non-financial firms.  For each of these 
four sub-categories, the value ranges from a 0 to 4, where a 4 indicates the most 
restrictive regulations on this sub-category of bank activity.  Thus, the index of overall 
restrictions can potentially range from 0 to 16.  The figure indicates the change in this 
index from Survey I to Survey III, where positive numbers indicate an increase in 
restrictions on bank activities. 
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Notes: The index of bank capital regulations includes information on (1) the extent of regulatory 
requirements regarding the amount of capital banks must hold and (2) the stringency of regulations on the 
source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities, 
borrowed funds, and whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities verify the sources of capital.  Large 
values indicate more stringent capital regulations.  The maximum possible value is nine, while the 
minimum possible value is zero.  The figure indicates the change in the index of bank capital regulations 
from Survey I to Survey III, where positive numbers indicate an increase in restrictions on bank capital. 
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Notes: The official supervisory index measures the degree to which the country’s commercial bank 
supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions.  It is composed of information on many 
features of official supervision: 1.Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors 
about banks? 2. Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency about elicit 
activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for 
negligence? 4. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 5. 
Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's 
directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory 
agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends?  b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8. 
Can the supervisory agency supersede the rights of bank shareholders-and declare a bank insolvent? 9. Can 
the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights? 10. Can the supervisory agency : a) 
Supersede shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors?  The 
official supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum value of 0, where larger numbers 
indicate greater power.  The figure indicates the change in the index of official supervisory power from 
Survey I to Survey III, where positive numbers indicate an increase in official supervisory power. 
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Notes: The private monitoring index measures the degree to which regulations empower, facilitate, and 
encourage the private sector to monitor banks.  It is composed of information on whether (1) bank directors 
and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of information disclosed to the public, (2) whether banks 
must publish consolidated accounts, (3) whether banks must be audited by certified international auditors, 
(4) whether 100% of the largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies, (5) whether off-balance 
sheet items are disclosed to the public, (6) whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures 
to the public, (7) whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while the 
loan is still non-performing (8) whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of  capital, and (9) whether 
there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was paid the last time a bank failed. The 
private monitoring index has a maximum value of 9 and a minimum value of 0, where larger numbers 
indicate greater regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of banks.  The figure indicates the change 
in the index of private monitoring from Survey I to Survey III, where positive numbers indicate an increase 
in private monitoring power. 
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Figure 5: Simulated Change in the Probability of a Banking Crisis from Changes 




















































































Figure 6: Simulated Change in Corruption in Lending from Changes in the Index 
of Official Supervisory Powers from Survey I to Survey III 
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Figure 7: Simulated Change in Corruption in Lending from Changes in the Index 
of Private Monitoring from Survey I to Survey III. 
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